The controller in action- participative control here and now in product development processes by Edström, Anders & Jönsson, Sten
GRI-report 1999:4
The controller in action
- participative control here and now
in product development processes.
by Sten Jönsson
& Anders Edström
GRI-report 1999:4
1
Gothenburg Research Institute
The controller in action - participative control here and now in
product development processes.
by
Sten Jönsson
and
Anders Edström
GRI
School of Economics and Commercial Law
Göteborg University
(   sten.jonsson@gri.gu.se   )
Abstract
This paper analyses a video recorded exchange in a product development
management group with a specific focus on the controller in action. This
specimen of data serves to illustrate how larger issues of strategy and
structure can be captured in the micro processes of a team. It is found that the
controller seems to attend to rule making at the interface between alliance
partners rather than chasing cost reductions to meet target costs. The latter
task is effectively delegated to the responsible engineers through the design of
the project and its time schedule. While we usually think of the controller as
representing the principal or at least serve in an agency setting these findings
point to a role as rule designer, i.e., as designer of the context in which cost
control takes place. Action, here and now, will focus on diagnosis and
maintenance of that context.
Introduction
Controlling costs, time, technology and quality is in focus in the debate on competition
and lean production today (Cooper 1995). Fierce competition in some industries
(cameras, cars, other consumer durables) provides for a slim “survival zone” where
price, functionality, and quality have to be fixed in close proximity of what other
competitors chose. Winners gain little and losers lose much. The solution when it comes
to steering costs toward this zone is target costing. In a first step the company analyses
the market to decide an expected sales price in the chosen market niche. From this the
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desirable margin is deducted and we arrive at a allowable cost. In a second step the
analysis is focused on the product and its position in the company’s product line common
parts etc. Then value engineering is applied on the component level, and this gives a target
cost broken down to the component level. Problem solved! Hopefully there is a balance
between the market deduced requirements (one could expect the market department to try
to make its own task easier by requiring a low price for a luxurious car!) and the
production department’s interests in a design that is production friendly. Even when this
balancing act is carried out with a sense of justice and the right judgement of what
constitutes competitive power among cars five years from now, there remains the
question how to do it. Target costing is a planning exercise. Some rationalists still believe
that you think first and then you just do it, and thus rationality rules. In “real life”,
however, things do not always turn out as expected. That is why there are controllers!
When the next year’s car model has been specified in terms of properties,  target cost, and
timing, a team of engineers is appointed to do the design work, release  the blue prints,
negotiate supplier participation, redesign tools, process investment, testing, deal with the
accounting department etc. In such a year model project there will be a controller in a staff
position in relation to the project leader. There will be a deputy project leader, somebody
in charge of quality and a project secretary to keep track of all minutes and decisions. The
main body of the project will be engineers with specialities like engine, transmission,
electricity, exterior, body, testing etc. They are directly responsible for each speciality with
a number of subordinated design task groups (like brakes or doors). They will make time
schedules for each part in their responsibility area to meet the master plan and they report
the status of their part of the project at the regular project meetings. It is not surprising that
focus at such meetings is on technical solutions and keeping time schedules. The different
components must progress in parallel, delays cause disorder in the whole project.
Problems abound and when they turn serious they are put on the agenda as “action
points”. This means that a status report has to be given at the beginning of every project
management meeting (every second week) until the problem declared solved. The
responsible engineer is nailed to the cross of explaining delay to his colleagues until he
can bring the matter to a solution.
Cost is also important! But so is safety, and quality, and the environment, and
technology, and “joy of driving”. The controller must be active and present in all kinds of
meetings where decisions with cost effects are made. It is not much use to present a
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controller’s report saying that last month the consumption of engineering hours was 10 %
above what was planned. The project will judge this use in relation to the job that has been
done or what problems have been solved. What happened last month is not very relevant
anyway because the task is to get the complete project designed and ready to go into
production by the set date, and there is little meaning in discussing what happened last
month. So, if the controller wants to influence the progress of the project towards targeted
costs he or she had better intervene here and now in the appropriate meetings when
decisions are prepared or taken. In order to be effective in such a role the controller must
know what is going on and recognise when an intervention is called for. How do
controllers accomplish this? Or do they bother at all? Maybe producing the relevant ex
post reports according to the predetermined schedule is the only available norm to follow?
The setting
This paper has its focus on accounting talk, i.e., how a controller  works with words in
the product development process. Data have been gathered in the joint venture
establishment set up by the Mitsubishi - Volvo alliance in Born in southern Holland. This
establishment produces cars (Carisma and S/V 40) based in a joint platform for the two
alliance partners. The alliance was formed in 1992 and tries to integrate Japanese lean
production philosophy with Swedish customer-value-through-safety thinking. The Volvo
side conducts its development of new models based in site (Mitsubishi’s development is
based in Japan.). This means that specialised design engineers used to a certain way of
working are removed from their usual environment and located in a different and more
sensitive situation. They work in the English language and are supposed to seek
commonality in solutions with the Japanese partner. The fact that the production company
is a separate, jointly owned, unit, means that the effects of design solutions on costs and
timing in the production process have to be negotiated. Closer co-operation with suppliers
in the development phase is also desirable; engineers have to travel between suppliers all
over the world to co-ordinate solutions. Travel costs have to be watched.
Co-ordination of the project does not only mean negotiating agreements with
suppliers, but also attending a large number of meetings where commitments of
different kinds are made (e.g., business area, Executive Committee New Projects,
Design review meeting, Action groups, Engine department, alliance committees of
many kinds). The project leader of one of the projects drew a picture of all meetings
outside the regular project management meeting which he participates in and which
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restrict his freedom of action through the commitments they generate. The map
contained more than 30 meetings (counting ”Suppliers” as one, even though the
number is large). Most binding are negotiated agreements with the alliance partner,
and with representatives of the joint venture, but also the line departments of the
home organisation may have very strong commitments to a certain solution due to
the family concept of the cars sold under the same brand. Complexity takes the
form of contradictory claims based in incompatible logics, as well as compromises,
and a sense of lack of freedom to choose, in combination with responsibility.
A complication which is due to the compressed time frame for car development is
that it is difficult for the organisation to learn from earlier projects, since they
overlap in time. The traditional “white books” reporting experiences at the end of
the project will not be of much use since two new year models are already under
way when the current one finishes. Some engineers will have to work for more
than one project in this era of lean organisation.
A further complication is that this is an alliance between competitors and the
purpose is to produce, in a jointly owned production plant, two different cars, the
Carisma and the V/S 40, on the same platform. A platform is a standard solution to
many of the technical systems and components that go into a car. There are
economies of scale if many parts are common, but on the other hand, if all parts
were common it would be difficult to compete. Obviously the basic geometry of
the two cars must be  the same to fit the process, but each partner designs specific
features into its car to make it attractive for the market niche it is intended for.
Commonality was a priority from the beginning of the alliance, but experience
shows that the proportion of common parts tends to decrease over time.
As to responsibilities it should first be noted that the production company, NedCar,
is a captive organisation in the sense that its owners are also its customers. The
customers sit on the board of directors meeting and push hard for cost reductions,
while the owners wait at the output gate for first rate quality cars, preferably in
many variants to satisfy differing market demands.
The control instrument from the owners is a business plan (and the derived
budgets) that specifies volumes and costs, often with strict cost reduction
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requirements. Any change in tooling or process equipment that is caused by a
change in design will have to find its way into the relevant budgets of the
production company and be approved at a fairly high organisational level. At the
same time the responsible design engineer, captured in the target costing
framework, is responsible for all costs related to a change in design, but he has to
get information on process costs from  another company, the NedCar. To illustrate
the meaning of this for the individual engineer imagine that he is responsible for the
driver’s unit and wants to change the design of the steering wheel, making it
“deeper” (from a flat design, like wheel, to a more cone-like design). This means
that the racks that the steering wheels were placed in at the appropriate work station
along the production line, can no longer accommodate 12 as before. The racks have
to be replaced, rebuilt, or there must be more of them for the same volume. The
cost for this is included in the cost of developing the new model. The estimate will
have to be provided by Process Engineering of the production plant, and the design
engineer has to make his decision on the basis of this estimate. Both parties are
under strict follow-up regimes and have to get such a cost change through formal
channels into their, respective, cost systems. It does not take much imagination to
see the game opportunities implied here.
There is not only a difference in responsibilities, there is a major difference in logic
between the two alliance partners. Volvo pursues a strategy of customer value in the
chosen market niche, while Mitsubishi is a volume producer who pursues
economies of scale and low cost. It is not that the partners do not agree that high
price and low cost is a nice combination, but in the nitty-gritty details of everyday
problem solving the lines of thought differ. Mitsubishi is inclined to think in terms
of process costs and time, while Volvo tends to think more in terms of customer
value. To illustrate; somebody has suggested that the customers in Japan place high
value in having outside rear mirrors that can be folded in narrow passages by the
driver pressing a button. The Volvo logic would be to ask how much the customer
will be willing to pay for this extra property and compare that to the extra cost it will
occur in design, production, logistics, service etc. if the difference is interesting
there will be an added variant for Japan. The “Mitsubishi” logic will be to see the
potential disturbance in production logistics that this variant will bring in addition to
increased costs. The revenue side is not very relevant since production is under a
cost budget. The effect of this is that good arguments have different weight with
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different composition of groups. We like to describe this mix of logics between the
two parties as the “strategic cross” (double meaning intended). The problem to be
illuminated is how does a controller work in such an environment? How does one
present arguments to be valid in two logics at the same time?
Data gathering
The study of communication and interaction where members interpret and react to
arguments here and now calls for as “real” data as possible. We want to gather
information of how members cope with the communication problems here and
now.
The data gathering was done in and around two model year teams with special
focus on the project management group (PMG) where the responsible engineers
meet to make project-related decisions. Interviews with actors related to these
PMGs (the 1998 and 1999 year models), as well as with the PMG members were
carried out. In all about 100 interviews have been made. The main data gathering,
however, has been done through the video-filming of project meetings. From the
video-film of a meeting 5 – 6 sequences of 1 – 2 minutes have been edited to a
separate tape. These sequences were then shown, one by one, to individual
members of the group with the question “What goes on here?”. The comments
were audiotaped and transcribed. For each sequence we thus have 15 or more
comments, usually dealing with background to the issue at hand and interpretations
of the implications of actor behaviour. The confrontations with the video sequences
were done about 3 months after the meeting in question. Many meetings have been
filmed. The analysis here will start with one sequence and then use other excerpts
from tapes that illustrate “live” controller behaviour.
Background to the sequence
The situation of the sequence below is that Al, the managing engineer  for Chassi
and Installation, is reporting on the status of his area of responsibility. The meeting
has gone on for 2.5 hours. Bob, who represents the function in NedCar that steers
new models into the production system, usually does not have time to attend whole
meetings. Now he is present and Al takes the opportunity to bring up a problem
that he was made painfully aware of in a recent Cost Review Meeting (CRM). In
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the CRM the status of the project in relation to target costs and project budgets are
followed up. Each responsible engineer is called upon to respond to cost
performance in relation to targets. Al, is responsible for all costs due to design
changes, including investment in tools and process. In the recent CRM new cost
estimates from process (made by cost engineering in the NedCar organisation)
were presented to him for the first time. Al could not answer and since then he has
investigated and found that the information on these costs in production process has
not been given to him. In Volvo it is a strict rule that the managing engineer (for,
e.g., Chassi) is responsible for all costs, without exception due to design changes.
He has a contract with the project leader and the rest of the hierarchy to deliver the
specified Chassi-content of the project in time and inside budget. At the CRM new
cost estimates were presented for him to explain. The crucial documents are the
PECs (Product Engineering Change) and their attached “Yellow forms”, that
specify investment consequences of design changes. The sum of such “yellow
form” investments goes into the NedCar budget as addition to the “Business Plan”
that is based on the original project content. Since Volvo has caused the extra
investment by changing the design Volvo has to authorise the change in the
investment budget before NedCar can start to spend the money.
From the NedCar perspective Production is under strong pressure from its owners
(Volvo Car and Mitsubishi Motor) to apply lean production. The budget for
investment in production facilities and tools has been trimmed to the limit in order
to minimise costs per car at the given volume and mix agreed in the basic plan.
Should the owners change design or add features (like introducing an extra colour
option) the investment effects of this will  have to be covered by the organisation
that initiated the change. Suffice it to say that changes offer an extra opportunity for
Production to buffer its budget, e.g., by arguing that the change in question will
cause a change in the schedule for the Paint Shop and there will be extra costs etc.,
etc..
The managing engineers for the different functional areas want to know cost effects
before they decide about a certain solution. The natural thing to do is to ask the
appropriate department at NedCar to estimate whether there are any final assembly
effects of the proposed change (which may be more or less specified in Design
Concept Sheets when the first question is posed). The problem is that the NedCar
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department wants a clearly specified question, while the project does not want to
use a large amount of engineering hours before they have a feeling for whether the
contemplated change is feasible. Thus the questions to NedCar often are based on
incomplete specifications and answers, consequently, will be only preliminary.
When the project has decided to carry out the change a PEC and the accompanying
“Yellow Form” is issued with a more definite estimate of the process investment
consequences. All these investment consequences (yellow forms) will be checked
by the controller and then confirmed by the Volvo representative in the Board of
Directors of NedCar and added to the NedCar budget.
The work units subordinated to the responsible engineer, who is a SU manager, are
called KUs. Activity teams are the groups that are formed with members from
NedCar and the project to  discuss consequences of design changes in the
production process. PECs are the Product Engineering Changes which are released
when a design change has been decided.
The sequence (Al expresses distrust in cost estimates).
PMG-meeting, 1999 year model, 1997-10-29, 11.38
Participants:
Al: SU manager, Chassi and Installation
Bob: Chief of the Project Management department at NedCar
Charles: SU manager, Body
David: the project leader
Eric: SU manager, Electricity
Fred: representing Product Planning (marketing side)
George: Project controller
- Start of sequence -
Al: .. during the CRMs we had the cost engineering guys from NedCar here
coming in saying that this is going to cost you this and this is going to cost you that
and my KUs and myself have not heard about these costs ... and while you are here
Bob... I sent you a memo on this .. <lower voice> I don't know whether you
agree...but I don't know where all these costs come from... we can't find them in
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PECs we can't find any memos and some of them have not even been discussed
properly in activity teams.
<Charles is trying to break in>
Bob: Costs come from the basic plan and from issues..... yeah I suppose now they
are updated... and in those... that document you find the investments
David: But aren't it normal that you have it also in PECs?
Bob: Initially that is not needed!
Erik: But if the investment is dependent upon the technical design that we do? But if
you don't get the feedback that this will cost you that much!?
Bob: But, listen! We have sheets for design... design concept sheets. That is correct
so we know the design. We report than in the cost integrated plan (?) So you can
discuss with these departments about the cost of course.. no problem.. if you are
okay on that then you know that this will be the cost for this project. If you change
the design then you have a problem!
Fred (?): Then you will see it on the PECs
Eric: I had the same experience as Al! The first time I saw these costs was when I
got a thick booklet <showing with the fingers how thick a pile of paper it was> ..
and when I read it through it said "investment in final assembly"! I never heard of
it! It had never been reported to me nor my KUs! It is not implemented in yellow
forms, I don't have a budget for it! I don't know what it is!
Bob: I don't report to KUs not even to SUs
Eric: Then it is not my problem, because I don't take the cost!
George: But Bob! If  we do not have corresponding figures between the sum of the
yellow sheets and the  basic plan we cannot sign the basic plan. We don't have those
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costs in the PECs, therefore we do not have them in the yellow sheets. So we need
to have the PECs updated, and the costs splitted up per KU!
Bob: No need. There is no need to have that additional investment on the PECs
George: Yes
Bob: Why?
George: Because we need to penetrate those costs as well as all other costs per KU
and it is the SUs responsibility to say if these figures are correct or not. The basic
plan is just the sum of all costs and when that sum fits with the sum of our yellow
forms then the basic plan is okay. If it is not the same sum then it is not okay!
- End of sequence -
What goes on here?
Al complains that in the cost review meetings cost engineers from NedCar has
presented investment costs in final assembly due to product changes which have
not been heard of before and which have not been recorded in the appropriate
documents. It seems like NedCar is sending bills which have not been agreed. Bob
explains that the costs are recorded in the basic plan. If you change the design then
you have problems! There is a discussion of how effects of design changes are
recorded in the documents. Territory is invoked; Erik saying that if cost are not
reported to (ex ante) him he will not accept them (ex post), Bob says that he does
not report to SUs or KUs. George intervenes by explaining the rules of the game
between Volvo and NedCar on this issue. Bob maintains that it is not necessary to
report investment cost on the PECs. George reiterates that it is, because before
accepting the increase in the process investment budget Volvo will check “yellow
form” figures against the lump sum requested by Bob’s department; the final word
rests with Volvo.
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This is a case of crossing of responsibilities which was highlighted in a recent
CRM. Responsible SU managers must have the estimates as a basis for decisions
on design changes (and they want them early, before much engineering work has
been spent!). Bob does not recognise the matrix situation and argues from the
simpler hierarchical position (implying that one way to avoid these extra costs is not
to change designs!). George’s argument is that there is a procedure that must be
followed.
Comments by participants.
Speakers
Al, a British national, is glad he was the one that brought up the issue. Colleagues,
who had brought it up, recognised the problem and supported him. Al points out
that Bob, obviously, does not understand how Volvo is running the project, and that
the different design areas are responsible for the costs they cause by design
changes. Bob had said the same thing before the meeting when Al had brought the
matter up face-to-face with him. The problem was not solved at the meeting and it
is still not clear whether it will ever be solved.
Al gives example to illustrate how tool and assembly investment costs must enter
into consideration before design changes are decided, and how frustrating it is to
have squeezed the design inside the budget and then find out that there are surprise
figures from Final Assembly when it is too late to do anything about it (and on top
of that have Volvo headquarters’ wrath for not being able to keep within the
budget.)
Most of the time these surprises do not amount to very much money, but where
will it end? This is the affect driver and Al is the one who brought the issue up.
David, the project leader, sees this as an illustration to how ways of working are
confronted. The established Volvo way is that the SU managers are strictly
responsible across functions. All costs related to a contemplated design change
must be accounted for in one report. You must see the whole picture, not bits and
pieces. The problem is that NedCar responds to  design change proposals in two
ways. The (production) process consequences are described first via the Design
Concept Sheet and then via the PEC. The PEC is the final technical solution which
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announces that a Change Order will be released. This is a more worked through
document that can be trusted, while the Design Concept Sheet is just a tentative
design. An estimate based on that document will also be tentative.  NedCar has a
very competent Cost Engineering department, but it only works on the basis of
PECs (not on the Design Concept Sheets). They use the PEC when their
purchasing engineers discuss with suppliers etc. to find the best solution. As a
consequence the project gets the cost estimates based on the PECs only in the
CRMs, while the project engineers may have more tentative figures based on the
Design Concept Sheets.
David also explains that changes to the investment figures in the Basic Plan of
NedCar require board meeting decisions, and that Volvo’s controller checks the
figures before Volvo confirms the part of the budget changes that relate to design
changes. When the figures from the Design Concept Sheets are compared to the
PEC figures there will be a deviation, and this is a reason for correcting the NedCar
budget. But it must also be possible to trace the deviations to the individual
responsibility areas in the project. The problem is that there is a “grey area”
between the Design Concept Sheet and the PEC. If there are several changes under
ways, when does a Design Concept Sheet become a PEC?  David (originally a
production man) is of the opinion that there is not enough understanding among the
project engineers and the production people at NedCar. After all there is a common
aim to make NedCar an effective production organisation, and that calls for
technical solutions that are process oriented, without loosing the customer value
properties. There should be harmony between the stand Volvo takes as shareholder
in the production company and as design project manager.
George, the controller, starts out by giving the background to this discussion. It is in
the Cost Review Meetings that project costs are followed up, component by
component, S U by S U. George is there, the accountant serving the particular SU,
Cost Engineering and the Costing Group (working with tool costs and product
costs) are also represented. The Cost Review means that the reports from Cost
Engineering and the Costing Group with the opinions of the SU managers based in
their data. It turns out that for almost every SU the yellow sheets were not properly
updated. The yellow sheets are there from the start, based on the Design Concept
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Sheets, and they are supposed to be refined as you go along. Since they are not
design engineers do not have the full cost picture when they even if they are
responsible, and the are surprised in the CRMs. They are agitated in this meeting
and ask for David’s support. Obviously they must know all costs in order to be
able to assume responsibility.
Now, Bob says (for NedCar) that they have summarised all costs in the basic plan,
which is a NedCar document containing their offer to the board. The expenditure is
justified by added processing value etc. and he thinks that is all what is needed to
get the investment budget decision in the NedCar board. George doesn’t think so.
The matter has not been solved yet. The project has asked Bob or somebody from
his department to be present at our CRMs and explain their cost figures. They will
probably comply but not during the life time of this project. The reason for this
“optimism” is that NedCar themselves have complained that the Volvo design
engineers are not paying enough attention to the production effects of their design
changes. Given this complaint it is only reasonable to accept that a prerequisite for
such attention is that the design engineers are provided with the proper information.
George goes on to comment on the great difference in ways of working between
NedCar and the project.  He has done a gigantic job to try to reconcile the figures
from the yellow forms with component costs and with the proposed Basic Plan.
David, the project leader, has to sign the Basic Plan before it is presented to the
NedCar board. For them the important document is the Basic Plan, for the project it
is the yellow forms. He has not signed the plan and the production department has
not come up with the required details, “and there we stand”. Probably they are too
short on staff, but there is also disagreement about the relations between NedCar
and Volvo inside the NedCar organisation. The Cost Group wants to clear out this
mess, but it seems like Bob wants to run it his way. However it seems like Bob has
got an assistant (with experience from Gent and Gothenburg) who will deal with
the project now and he is much more flexible. The interface will be smoother but
we do not know about the willingness of the core of NedCar to be more
forthcoming on adapting procedures to “real” problems. George, the controller, is
largely focused on procedures, and the need to reconcile figures. This seems to be
the reason why his comments deal exclusively with procedures and the discipline
necessary for them to work.
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Eric,  a fairly newly appointed SU manager, says “Well, this is not really about
costs but about ways of working.” There is no set procedure for dealing with how
design engineer can get the necessary information from Production. It is not only
cost figures, it is also how a design change will effect assembly time. A saving of
assembly time might justify the investment in process. Now he has to work
without reliable information, and George has to put a lot of work into splitting up
the lump sum reported by NedCar on SUs and KUs. Eric illustrates with stories
and also points out that in fact Bob does not know the realities of the problem. He
bases his comments on some ideal model (which does not have a real life
correspondence). In real life there must be direct contact between many engineers
on both side. Using the project leader and Bob as window persons generates a
bottle neck. All this illustrates that we do not understand fully how it works down
there (inside NedCar) and they do not see how we work. Eric also comments on
how it has become more and more important to know exactly for which project you
are working and who is paying. If it is a quality problem the Quality department
may be willing to finance. If the solution may be introduced as a “running change”
matters will be different. There are always several different projects under way and
the same engineer may be engaged in several projects. You have to know the cost
in detail related to our responsibility.
Eric’s comments illustrates how more complex the responsibility of the SU
engineer is now when there is a continuous flow of new year model project,
intermixed with running changes and quality improvement projects. Often the same
engineers are involved in several projects at the same time.
We have not been able to obtain comments from Bob on this sequence.
Non-speakers
The comments by participants who did not take part in this particular exchange
confirm the general opinion that there is a procedural gap between the two
organisations. Some comments indicate suspicion that some costs are covered up.
The deputy project leader points out that the problem is discovered only when you
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discover the lack of information through the CRM surprises. Until then you believe
that the yellow form figures are the real figures, because this is how it is in the
Volvo way of working.  It seems like there is a better grip on supplier costs than on
NedCar final assembly costs at present. We have to work on this. You see the value
of detailed information when it is missing.
Other commentators give more wide ranging views. A Dutch engineer, working in
the project, pointed out that the basic plan contains an investment column with lump
sum figures. It is difficult to understand why the NedCar people do not
communicate on the SU level since they have the figures. The conclusion must be
that the forum for this communication, the activity teams (where design, process,
and purchasing engineers sit down to discuss PEC issues and work out
consequences) do not function properly. (This was the only comment to this
effect!). This informant proposes the theory that Bob wants to establish a rule
which says that activity teams may only be set up when NedCar approves –
implying that NedCar has determined the process costs based on Design Concept
Sheets – while the Volvo way of working requires a continuous dialogue until a
solution that satisfies all parties has been found. This, however, would require
delegation of authority for lower level people to commit NedCar to solutions they
cannot guarantee since they are controlled by an investment budget decided at the
very top. NedCar does not like such a floating situation, but the whole idea with a
project is to find good design solutions to the preliminary design sketches shown in
the Design Concept Sheets! Some components will be carried over from last year’s
model, but several hundred will be changed. Until this impasse is solved NedCar is
likely to resist design changes that effect their investment budget. The explanation is
that the activity teams have not been implemented properly.
A more experienced engineer blames the differences in ways of working. NedCar
tends to work in a “relay” fashion. First you decide what you want and then you
calculate the cost. Volvo needs cost estimates much earlier. In his area they have set
up a short circuit in that they have engaged some people from NedCar in regular
meetings every second week to work out agreements on issues like this one. Al and
Eric are newcomers who do not know their way around down here yet. That is why
they were surprised at the CRM. Still Bob is to blame that the formal rules do not
work (i.e., that yellow forms are up-dated). This can be compensated by keeping
close relations to Purchasing to keep informed. You have to work informally.
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The SU manager for Technical Documentation informs that this procedure has been
in force since last year’s model and the logic of it requires that the yellow forms is
the primary data source for cost reports and the basic plan. There is work under
way but the next year model project will no doubt stumble into the same
problematic before it is solved. The method in working out routines has been to
solve problem by problem as they arise. But there is power politics involved, if
NedCar find that they do not have a say in procedural matters they might just turn
stubborn. Bob is the embodiment of this approach to discussions, others are more
accommodating.
Another team member points out that since NedCar is carrying out the investment
and since their costing department has the correct figures they should have the final
say on process costs. The thought model is that Volvo places an order and NedCar
calculates the price. Negotiations could be carried out in the activity teams.
The engineer in charge of testing is not concerned by the problems dealt with in this
sequence but he recognises similar yellow form problems when he orders special
tests to be performed by the Testing department in Gothenburg. But he never has
the problems indicated here. You order a test, they give the cost for it, this is entered
on the yellow form and given to the Controller, and that is the end to it. No
problem. (Because the test is ordered irrespective of costs?)
One respondent provides information on other projects to co-ordinate information.
A new manual describing the procedure to develop an existing car (DEC process)
is under way. There is work under way to solve problems that relate to the
differences in computer systems where Volvo, NedCar and Mitsubishi specify their
cars respectively.
The engineer representing the market side (Product Planning) had not thought much
about the problem until the video sequence was shown, but he was able to construct
an understanding of the problem by tracing how the routine usually is; Normally an
engineer who is contemplating a design change will do a desk study to investigate
whether the idea is technically feasible before NedCar is approached. Of course
process consequences should be included then. It would be nice if NedCar could
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respond to informal questions (like,’ I am thinking about this change, do you see
any problems with that?’), but NedCar only responds to complete, well specified
study requests (i.e., PECs) so you have to go on without the requested information.
Sometimes an engineer will bring up a question in the PMG meeting whether he
should do a desk study on a possible technical solution in order to be on the safe
side, but then Bob will attack on the basis that this study has not been presented to
NedCar and one should not go ahead before the process consequences are better
estimated.  In order to be able to specify a study request you have to be pretty sure
about what you want to do and you don’t know until you have the answer from
NedCar! Since Bob is a bit grumpy on this people sometimes hesitate to contact
him in early stages and get out of this impasse by presenting studies exclusive of
process costs. Co-operation with NedCar is not full teamwork yet.
One SU manager was very upset in his comments on the sequence. He had just got
a (delayed) report showing that process costs would amount to an amount that was
larger than the entire design task budget for the job, and it was just a lump sum.
When he asked for a specification he got a fax – in Dutch. There is a meeting later
today to sort things out. You really have to be very active to get proper estimates of
process costs; the engineers in NedCar are fairly easy to deal with but their boss is
very protective of his plan and cost estimates. He makes it more difficult to deal
directly with them. It would be nice to have some Volvo people employed in the
NedCar organisation to help us get around in NedCar (like Mitsubishi has).
Analysis
The problem in this situation is that two organisations with different structures of
responsibility are confronted. The production organisation has a hierarchical and
functional structure, while the project has a task oriented structure. The project
engineers need information  broken down to the component level, while the
production organisation needs the information by department. The lump sum
budget is rational for the production department. If it can achieve the desired effects
by combining different changes so as to save some expenditure there will be a
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buffer left over in the budget that can be used in other improvements. This custom
NedCar has taken over from Mitsubishi.
Formally the production organisation has no obligation to report to these individual
engineers. There is an agreed procedure (based on Volvo’s “yellow forms”) but it
does not yet work in practice. One of the reasons for the problem is that the project
need the information early, before they have put too much engineering, while the
production organisation does not want to  study details and engage suppliers until
the design is reasonably final. Another reason is that newcomers have not yet
learned how to navigate the informal channels in the alliance and have to rely on
formal procedures (or they might not yet have learned which these procedures are).
They may know that the official policy of Volvo is to make the product
development process more similar to the corresponding processes in Volvo proper.
As a consequence the engineers who are new to the alliance environment behave as
if the genuine Volvo procedures are in operation, when they in fact are not. In sum
it can be said that the procedures, processes and responsibilities are in transition.
The hope is that when things have settled down, the process will be normal. A
more reasonable expectation is that things will never be normal. Flux is the normal
situation in an alliance.
The controller tries to stabilise “things” by institutionalising  the rules of the game.
This situation opens up an opportunity to explain (repeat) the rules and the
controller takes it. This time he grounds arguments in the power structure. Only if
the yellow form figures add up to the lump sum requested by NedCar Volvo will
release the funds. This is a compelling argument in facing up Bob, who is a
hierarchical man.
Bob sees himself as reporting to the top of his organisation, not to a more or less
anarchistic flock of engineers. George could have scolded the individual engineers
for not seeing to it that they have the updated investment figure in their yellow form
(more experienced colleagues told us about how one can keep one’s figures
updated), but he chooses to argue in support of the project claims. (There will be
other opportunities to remind engineers that they should be alert to update their
figures.)
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Such an opportunity is the CRM, the cost review meeting, which is designed to
check how well the project is likely to meet its component target costs. It was at
such a CRM that recently that the debating engineers had been surprised by latest
figures had been provided through formal channels department to department.
Newcomers, who are not familiar with the informal channels tend to trust the
procedural manual and not updated forms. They were shamed before the cost
review committee because they did not know their cost.  Al took the initiative (and
the risk) to bring the issue up in the project management meeting. He was pleased
that he had brought the issue up and gained support from fellow engineers that this
was a problem. It should be noted that the more experienced engineers did not say
much here. (No doubt hints will be given privately about how to get around it).
This sequence reminds us that there is continuous work on the formalisation of
procedures. At the time a committee was working on a new version of the overall
procedure for developing year models of an existing car. There was also a work
party on smoothing communication between Volvo and NedCar. These projects
were “inspired” by the experience of the last project (1998 model) that was just
finished.
Contemplating the role of the controller it seems like it is to help the project anchor
its processes in the existing set of rules and to initiate rule making when needed.  It
seems to be to uphold the rules of the game while being an inside team member at
the same time.
Having discovered this preliminary role we have searched a large number of
videotapes from meetings to see what else the controller does. Was this an
exceptional occasion or is the controller in action oriented towards making the rules
visible rather than pursuing the individual cost overdraft?
The first observation is that the next meeting in the project management group had
an item under the heading “Job Follow-ups” , the part of the agenda where the
status of specific tasks are reported and declared closed when the problem is solved.
When the problem is not solved the decision is “Still open”, and it appears on the
next agenda.  The item heading stated; process investment consequences of design
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changes should be reported through proper channels with “proper channels” high
lighted. Arriving at this point on the agenda the project leader (controller absent)
stated that information on the procedural aspects as seen by NedCar were available
and a meeting between the controller and representatives of NedCar is scheduled.
Then the controller will “tell us how to handle it”. It is obvious that the opportunity
to settle a procedural mis-match had been grasped and the controller was at work,
but there was no further discussion in the project meeting. Also in other project
meetings we found the controller to be fairly non-aggressive in his action. Most
initiatives were taken to assure that rules are understood and followed. The cost
pressure came from the project leader.
Second, the controller has been observed in one Cost Review Meeting (CRM) (the
1.5 day meeting Al referred to in his original complaint). The role of the
“inquisition” was conducted by representatives of the Cost Engineering department
at Headquarters, with the controller, if anything, supporting the local engineers in
defending their remaining overruns.
Thus this review only confirmed that the controller seems to have his focus
somewhere else than in controlling costs. We believe it has was on diplomacy at the
border between organisations. Looking closer at the interactions between the design
project and the production company we could detect two types of interaction;
interface management and interpenetration. The latter kind is when members of one
organisation enters the other organisation in search for information or commitment.
This is always on specific, concrete issues and is usually done informally and often
“illegally”. The latter is when interaction takes place at the border and in a formal
sense. The matters are “of principle” and deal with rules of the game. Diplomacy,
as it were, the output of which is formalisations (new forms, procedures,
committees etc.).
Managing at the interface
The “interpenetration” activities are usually driven by a specific task (e.g., engineer
X is considering a re-design of the steering wheel and wants to know from Process
Engineering if this design change will cause any costs due to new investment in
tools or process equipment). It is relatively easy to find the counterpart in the other
organisation with the relevant information. The problem might be to extract a firm
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commitment. The process engineer probably does not have the right to commit
his/her organisation, the matter must go through “proper channels” for that, but an
honest estimate from somebody who is trusted may serve well enough in the
design process. Experienced actors have organised regular, informal meetings to
keep strategic counterparts in the other organisation well informed about what is
going on in the project and in return meets a willingness to help. This way they
achieve a flexibility to circumvent all kinds of formal blockages, elegantly and in a
seemingly effortless way. The common task is the lode star.
Interface activities involve territorial rights.
It is ‘natural’ to assume that a production organisation needs a hierarchical structure
since the core activity is co-ordination material flows and adaptation of capacities to
this flow (inside a limited budget). Co-ordination problems will be moved upwards
for solution and it is a requirement that every move inside the responsibility area be
under unitary control.
The project organisation also is under a strict discipline, but of a different kind.
Creative solutions to design problems are wanted, but the task is very well specified
in advance and restricted in time and cost. Problem solving goes on in parallel but it
is a good strategy to keep informed about what the others are doing. Therefore there
are meetings, documentation in protocols and their appendices, and registration of
design changes in data bases. The individual actor earns his/her freedom to pursue
the task by keeping the others informed and by demonstrating competence. This
generates a strong discipline in the project.
When the two types of discipline are confronted there might be friction since the felt
urgency to find rules of the games that will allow both territories to maintain control
is generated from sources of different kind. Typically the project wants to avoid
delay while the production organisation wants to avoid costs. They both want to
avoid loss of discipline. Therefore the matter has to be dealt with at the interface,
and probably in a fragmented fashion; problem by problem. A work party with
representatives will be set up to solve the problem and anchor the solution. The
outcome will be formalisations, a new form, a procedure, a co-ordinating
committee.
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There is an initial contract, but unexpected events will occur and additions will be
made. This means that “manuals” have to be up-dated, which in turn requires work
parties etc. Process Engineering is responsible to adapt the production process to
incoming new models. Personnel is a scarce resource in a lean production regime.
The department head will become the natural “window person” through which
inquiries are channelled. He needs a matching window person to deal with issues
that are not strictly technical (like investment costs, and procedures). It is through
agreements on these that the specifics of the joint venture are worked out.
Traditionally the role of the accountant has been seen to be a technical expert
positioned between principal and agent (Ijiri 1975). In this case we see another role
close to the interface between alliance partners, not serving the hierarchical structure
as much as the horizontal efforts of creating win-win situations.
Conclusion:
This incident in the flow of incidents that makes up a product development project
serves to illustrate how the “business controller” role may shift in a alliance setting.
Instead of representing the principal in pursuit of  compliance with plans, the
controller may serve efficiency better by working at the interface between alliance
partners. Discipline is strong on both sides although they stem from different
urgencies. Rule making at the interface might be the best way to serve both
customer value (differentiation) and cost leadership at the same time.
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